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Schleining v. Cap One, Inc., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 36 (May 29, 2014)1
CONTRACT LAW: DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT
Summary
The Court determined two issues: 1) whether NRS 40.453 invalidates a guarantor’s
contractual waiver of the statutory right to be mailed a notice of default and 2) whether NRS
107.095 requires strict or substantial compliance by lenders giving notice of default, and if
substantial compliance is sufficient, whether there was substantial compliance in this case.
Disposition
The Legislature intended NRS 40.453 to invalidate a guarantor's purported contractual
waiver of the statutory right to be mailed a notice of default provided in NRS 107.095.
Substantial compliance can satisfy NRS 107.095's notice of default requirement, and, here, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the lender substantially complied
with NRS 107.095's notice requirement. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.
Factual and Procedural History
In May 2007, Decal Nevada, Inc., an entity solely owned by John Schleining, obtained a
loan from respondent lenders, Cap One, to help pay the purchase price of an undeveloped parcel
of real property. Schleining signed a personal guaranty of the loan, which included a waiver of
his right to receive notice of any default of the loan. After Decal defaulted, Cap One declined to
extend the loan and refused to release Schleining from her personal guaranty. One month later,
Cap One recorded a notice of default and election to sell. Cap One then mailed a copy of the
notice of default to Decal at various addresses, including Decal's office in St. Helens, Oregon—
an office Decal shared with Schleining. However, Cap One did not mail a separate copy of the
notice of default to Schleining as guarantor, as set forth in NRS 107.095. Additionally, Cap One
mailed a notice of trustee’s sale to Decal, again at Schleining’s shared St. Helens, Oregon,
address though a notice was not mailed to Schleining, personally. A trustee's sale was held at
which Cap One was the only bidder on the property, purchasing it for $100,000.
Cap One then filed a complaint seeking a deficiency judgment against Schleining as
guarantor. The district court ruled that Schleining’s contractual waiver of notice was invalid
pursuant to NRS 40.453. The district court further ruled that, because Schleining had actual
notice of the default and foreclosure sale and was not prejudiced by the lack of formal notice,
Cap One had substantially complied with NRS 107.095. Thus, the district court awarded a
deficiency judgment against Schleining in favor of Cap One.
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Discussion
Pursuant to NRS 40.453, Schleining could not waive the right to be mailed the notice of default
Though not codified in the same subchapter NRS 107.095 (providing borrowers and
guarantors a right to notice of default) and NRS 40.453 (disallowing contractual waivers of
certain statutory rights) relate to the same subject matter and were enacted as part of the same
bill. Accordingly, the Court determined that NRS 107.095 falls within the scope of NRS 40.453's
prohibited waivers. The district court properly invalidated Schleining's waiver of his right to be
mailed the notice of default.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Cap One substantially
complied with the notice requirement in NRS 107.095
Given that the Legislature intended for a substantial compliance standard to apply with
regard to Cap One's duty to provide notice to borrower Decal under NRS 107.080, there is no
reason why the Legislature would intend for a strict-compliance standard to apply when
providing the same notice directly to guarantor Schleining under NRS 107.095. The purpose of
NRS 107.095 is simply to notify the guarantor that the loan is in default and that the lender has
elected to foreclose on the secured property. Substantial compliance is sufficient where actual
notice occurs and there is no prejudice to the party entitled to notice.2 The Court found
Schleining had actual knowledge of the default and the pending foreclosure sale despite the lack
of statutory notice. Additionally, Schleining was not prejudiced by the lack of statutory notice.
Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Conclusion
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined Schleining’s actual
notice of the default and foreclosure sale, coupled with the lack of prejudice, satisfied the
purpose of NRS 107.095. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
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